The tragic accident of the Costa Concordia in January 2012 was one of the most severe large passenger ship accident in Europe in recent times followed by a tremendous public interest. We present the results of an in-depth technical investigation of the flooding sequence which lead to the heeling and grounding of the ship.
INTRODUCTION
The COSTA CONCORDIA sank in the early morning of January 14, 2012 near the island of Giglio in the Mediterranean Sea. A few hours earlier she had hit an underwater rock when performing a tight turn at high speed very close to the shore. As a result of this collision she drifted powerless near to the harbour of Giglio where she grounded a second time and evacuation procedures were started. The list gradually increased until she finally capsized and came to rest on the rocks in shallow waters. Thirty-two of the 4229 persons on board lost their lives during the flooding and capsizing of the ship.
In the scope of this investigation our institute strongly cooperates with the German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU). This paper represents a short summary of the most interesting results of the elaborate investigation carried out in [1] .
FLOODING MODEL
The applied numerical flooding simulation determines the fluxes through the openings by means of a hydraulic model. The propagation of the water volumes is computed by a predictorcorrector scheme for the integration of the volume fluxes to each compartment in question. Further details about the numerical method can be found in [2] .
Flux Determination
The in-or egress of flood water through the internal and external openings can be idealized by the incompressible, stationary and viscous-and rotational free Bernoulli equation given in Eqn. 1 formulated for a streamline connecting point a and point b:
The dissipative energy term ϕ ab accounts for pressure losses through the openings and is assumed to be proportional to the kinetic energy of the flow. This loss is modeled by a semi-empirical discharge coefficient C d . The pressure height difference dz yields the fluid velocity
For a free outflow, the pressure height difference becomes:
The integration of the velocity over the area of the opening assuming a perpendicular flow direction leads to the total flux:
The solution of this integral becomes more complicated if the opening is large and of arbitrary shape and orientation. Therefore, larger openings are discretized in smaller, elementary parts for which an analytical solution of the volume flux can be determined as described for example in [2] .
Flooding Paths
The possible paths of the floodwater through the inner subdivision of the vessel is described with the help of directed graphs. The openings are the edges of the graph connecting the different compartments representing the nodes. This gives a required sign convention for the opening fluxes and allows to obtain the mass balance for one compartment by the sum over all edges connected to one node. In addition, further algorithms from graph theory can be applied. An example of such a flooding graph is shown in Fig. 1 , which is the simplified flooding graph of the initial damage of the COSTA CONCORDIA. The complete flooding graph is much more complex.
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Integration Scheme
The amount of water dV propagated in one time step to one compartment from its neighbor(s) is given by the integration of the sum of the volume fluxes Q o (t) over all connected openings:
The propagation of water leads to a new distribution of the flood water and new volume fillings in the compartments. These volumes depend nonlinear on the water levels of the compartments and has to be determined iteratively. The flux function Q o (t) is also a nonlinear function over time. To account for this nonlinear characteristic, a predictor-corrector scheme is applied for the integration over time, which is sketched as follows: 
Conditional Openings
The flooding sequence through complex inner subdivisions of ships is highly influenced by flooding barriers like doors. Especially for the COSTA CONCORDIA accident, the time dependent closure and opening of the watertight doors has a high impact on the flooding sequence. In addition, windows or doors only withstand a certain pressure head before these collapse. This conditional behavior of doors and windows can be modeled by certain opening conditions and events.
The current pressure head acting on one opening is updated at each time step. If this pressure exceeds a certain threshold, recommended values can be found for example in [3] , the opening breaks and it is assumed to be open for the remaining time.
Especially during accident situations, watertight doors are not always kept closed. The event of activating these doors are accounted for in the numerical simulation. These are defined as events, which changes the current status of a certain opening depending on a given condition like time or pressure head.
An very simple example for three conditions is shown in Fig. 2 . This shows the change of the discharge coefficient for certain events. After 25 secs the value is lowered to 20 % in a time interval of 10 secs. The value is increased again up to 60 % at 55 secs. A breaking of the opening is modeled by the last event, which depends on the current pressure height. This allows also to define a leakage of the opening, if the condition is chosen appropriately. For example, the discharge coefficient varies between 0 and 2 m from 0 to 5 % and from 2 m to 2 m between 5 and 100 %, were the last event models the collapsing of the opening.
Simulation Overview
One time step of the simulation is sketched as follows: The pressure iteration for completely flooded compartments is required, because the water must be still propagated through the full compartment. This leads to a coupling of the neighboring compartments. The remaining free variable here is the internal pressure of the full compartment, which is iterated until the total flux in one time step becomes zero.
In most of the cases, the influence of air compression is of minor importance and can be neglected. However, if required, a pressure increase caused by the air volume reduction according to the Boyle-Marriot law is applied.
More details about additional features like the influence of a contact with the sea bottom can be found for example in [4, 2] .
Validation
The flooding simulation has been successfully validated with the ITTC benchmark model test for the prediction of time to flood [5] as described in more detail in [6] . The obtained numerical results match very well with the measured ones. In addition, the described method has been applied to the reconstruction of three real ship accidents. The computed motion of the vessels after water ingress and the general time line of events matches well with the observations of the witnesses and the other investigations carried out for these accidents. Details of the validation part and the investigations of the accidents can be found in [2] .
THE COSTA CONCORDIA ACCIDENT
Having left the port of Civitavecchia near Rome on the evening of January 13, 2012 the ship was on her way to Savona in Northern Italy with 3206 passengers and 1023 crew on board. En route she changed her planned course and headed for Giglio at a speed of over 15 knots where she was to perform a tight starboard turn near the coast. The final course of the COSTA CONCORDIA is shown as an extract of the AIS track in Fig. 3 .
Approaching the shore, she collided with the "Scole Rocks" below the waterline on her port side, which lead to the damage of five watertight compartments. These contained amongst others the electric propulsion motors, all diesel generators as well as the main switchboard. The initial list was to port due to the leak being on that side and because of the heeling moment caused by the rock, which stuck inside the vessel after the impact. After a while the flooding became almost symmetrical and the ship went upright again.
Having been damaged in compartments vital for power generation, power distribution and propulsion, she was soon adrift without electricity. Even though the emergency diesel generator started up, it did not work reliable enough to provide power. Thus, emergency power was supplied by UPS batteries. However, the steering gear did not function and thrusters needed more than the emergency power provided. Due to wind and current the vessel was eventually moved north of Giglio harbor before the forces of nature turned her around 180 degrees and pushed her in the direction of the island until she grounded a second time.
At this time the evacuation procedures were started, while the heeling angle to starboard continuously increased. In the early hours of the next morning, she had finally capsized and sunk onto the seabed approximately 25 meters deep until she was at last raised on September 16, 2013.
Overview of the Time Line of Events
The time line of important events are summarized in Tab. 1 to give a brief overview of the accident. Only events related to the technical investigation of the flooding sequence are given, further interesting events concerning passenger safety and the evacuation procedure are omitted here. An interesting sociological study of the events can be found in [8] including a reference to the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) replay released by the Italian consumer protection organization CodaCons [9] .
Immediately after the accident the ship heels to port due to the impact by the rocks below the center of gravity and due to the starboard turn. Shortly thereafter, the blackout happens, indicating the contact of flood water with vital electrical components. In some parts of the Italian investigation there is an earlier time stated for the blackout, namely at 20:45:58 UTC after 51 seconds. The final blackout however shows clearly after 108 seconds according to the monitoring of the watertight doors on the VDR [10] . Water in the Main Switchboard Room on Deck A is reported seven minutes after the collision, and another eight minutes later three (5, 6 and 7) of the five damaged compartments are indicated to be flooded. Compartment 4 is also heavily flooded, while Compartment 8 only suffered a minor leak in the double bottom. During the flooding of these compartments the ship lists FIGURE 3: AIS track of the COSTA CONCORDIA [7] (given times are local time) about 10 to 15 degrees to port, as can be seen in several passengers' video recordings. This is supported by the wind, which blows from north-north-east at approximately 10 knots onto the starboard side of the vessel.
Some 25 minutes into the accident, the list of the ship changes from port to starboard due to the flooding becoming more symmetrical. This coincides with the turning of the vessel and her drifting towards the island, which means that the wind is now coming from the port side. Approximately 40 minutes past the collision water reaches the freeboard deck, Deck 0, while it heels the ship almost 10 degrees to starboard.
The starboard anchor is dropped one hour and a few minutes after the accident after several failed attempts. According to the photometric evaluation [11] the ship has a starboard list of about 14 to 14.5 degrees at that time. This order of magnitude of the heeling angle is supported by the statement of a bridge officer around the same time. The trim angle is determined to be 1.2 degrees, which results in a trim of 5.19 meters to the aft. There is of course some measuring inaccuracy so that the real angles may differ slightly. Nevertheless these values are the most reliable ones because they are not based on observations made by the One hour and ten minutes subsequent to the first grounding the vessel grounds a second time with the aft starboard side. At the same time the first lifeboats are launched, starting on the starboard side to reduce the list. The last heeling angle stated by the crew on the VDR is 25 to 30 degrees to starboard at 22:11:26 UTC. Almost three hours after taking the damage the vessel capsizes assuming a heeling angle of around 90 degrees as confirmed by a coastguard helicopter. From here on she sinks completely and comes to rest on the rocks with a list of approximately 70 degrees.
Description of the Vessel
The COSTA CONCORDIA was built in 2004 for the Italian cruise line Costa Crociere by Fincantieri in Sestri Ponente. Her main particulars are given in Tab. 2.
Computational Data Model
The hull form and the compartmentation is thoroughly reconstructed. A complete definition of the hull up to the highest deck is required for the complex flooding calculations. The hy- Fig. 4 .
FIGURE 4: Hydrostatic Model
In contrast to classical damage and intact stability calculations, the inner subdivision has to be refined, because additional flooding barriers like A-class walls or cabin walls have to be taken into account. The permeability is set to SOLAS standard. In addition, opening elements are defined to model doors, windows and other objects, which allow a water exchange between the compartments. In total, 642 compartments and 1580 openings are included in the data model.
Loading Condition prior to Sinking
The loading condition of the vessel was reconstructed based on the information given in [7] . All intact and damage criteria including the ones for passenger vessels are fulfilled. The corresponding righting lever arm curve for the intact condition is shown in Fig. 5 . This does not include the influence of the upper decks.
Damage to the Hull
The impact with the rock caused a large and narrow underwater damage to the hull extending over a length of approximately 45 m from the bottom up to deck B. The assumed extend of damage together with immediately damaged compartments is shown in Fig. 6 . FIGURE 6: Schematic side view of the real leak (blue surface) [7] , the defined openings (red rectangles) and the initially damaged compartments (blue pattern) The damage is modeled by eleven smaller openings, which allow an immediate water ingress to the sketched compartments. A discharge coefficient of 0.6 is assumed for most of them, only the rearmost is lowered to 0.2, because the flow is obstructed by the rock.
The Watertight Doors
The COSTA CONCORDIA is equipped with 25 watertight doors (WTD) to allow the crew to pass bulkheads in the watertight part below the freeboard deck. The doors are positioned on FIGURE 5: Intact lever arm curve of the COSTA CONCORDIA the three decks C, B and A. The specific location of the doors can be found in [1] . Even though, these doors shall be closed at sea, some of the doors were allowed by the Administration to be kept open if deemed necessary. These exceptions are the watertight doors 7, 8, 12, 13 and 24. Any activation of a watertight door is logged in the VDR, which data were made available after the accident. This means, that the status of each door during the accident is known and can be taken into account for the flooding simulation. Details of the watertight door activity can be found in [10, 9] .
Heeling Moments
Beside the water ingress, further aspects were identified which had an influence on the time line of events of the accident. These are summarized as follows:
-Activation of the watertight doors -Heeling moment due to the rock -External moment caused by the wind -Moments exerted by the stabilizer fins -Impact of the grounding event
The activation of the watertight doors is discussed in more detail in the results section, because it plays a very important role to explain the observed flooding sequence.
Parts of the underwater rock, which penetrated the hull were stuck inside the steel structure. This caused a permanent heeling of about 650 tm to the port side.
At the time of the accident the wind were measured on a mountain near Giglio at a height of 600 meters blowing from north-north-east at 18 knots. A realistic value at sea level amounts to 10 knots. The caused wind force on the COSTA CON-CORDIA has only little effect on the heel of the vessel, because most of the time the wind was blowing almost from the front [1, p. 39 ff]. The wind moment will therefore be excluded from the further calculations. The main influence of the wind combined with the current is the forced drift back to the shore, which prevented the vessel and its passengers from a much more severe fate on the open sea.
Another aspect of interest is the influence of the stabilizer, which can be seen in several photos taken after the accident. It is found that the moment exerted by the port side stabilizer either cancels with the wind moment or becomes so small with decreasing speed that it almost vanishes why its influence is also excluded from further calculations.
The impact of the second grounding can only be briefly discussed due to limited available bathymetric information about the real geometry of the seabed below the vessel. With an assumed flat seabed here, the later development of the heel angle cannot be explained [1, page 76] . From the salvage it is known that two main underwater pinning points exist. The vessel was probably pushed by wind and current against these points and the friction force prevented the hull from sliding further down the seabed profile. These effects combined lead probably to the final position of the COSTA CONCORDIA. Due to the unclear underwater situation, further calculations regarding the influence of the second grounding are not performed.
MOST LIKELY SCENARIO
The detailed analysis of the sinking sequence can be found in the results section of [1] . That part of the report elaborately describes the water progression inside the vessel, the influence of the different heeling moments, the impact of the activated watertight doors and the effect of the second grounding. Furthermore, three hypothetical scenarios are investigated. In the following, only a brief summary of the most important results can be given.
The first scenario presented here takes into account all possible information available thus representing the most likely one. The activity of the watertight doors are taken from the VDR data. The rock moment is applied, the wind and the moment from the stabilizer fins are neglected as argued in the previous section. The numerical simulation ends at the point of the grounding impact. The leakage and collapsing of the openings are modeled according to results obtained in [3] . The only watertight door which is assumed to leak is No. 24, since it is reported by witnesses that the corresponding watertight bulkhead has been deformed during the collision.
Development of the floating position
The first theoretical scenario established serves as a reference, because neither external influences nor the activity of the watertight doors are considered. It is only used to demonstrate the influence of the different contributing factors on the flooding sequence.
This reference case is compared with the scenario, which is believed to represent the most likely one. The development of the floating position for both scenarios is shown in Fig. 7 . First, the impact with the rock immediately followed by the sudden water ingress exerted a heel angle of 12-15 degrees to port with a draught increase by around 2 meters in less than a minute. Due to the almost symmetric layout of the initially flooded compartments, the heel angle decreases until it changes to starboard after around 18 minutes past the impact. The rock moment delays the change to starboard, while the activation of the watertight doors accelerates this change later, because a more unsymmetrical flooding is induced. In addition, the sinkage and the aft trim is slightly larger in the most likely scenario. This effect is just large enough to allow further progressive flooding above the freeboard Deck 0. The heel now constantly increases until the second grounding at around 21:50 UTC.
In addition, the floating position of the vessel just before grounding the second time in front of the Giglio harbor is compared in Fig. 8 . It shows the position obtained from the numerical flooding simulation compared with a photo taken by Giglio News in that night. Looking for example at the submergence of the aft windows as a reference, both positions differ only very little. This indicates that the constructed most likely scenario matches very well with the real accident situation and that the used numerical flooding simulation is a very valuable tool to investigate such accidents, if used appropriately. 
Change of the List to Starboard
The large free surfaces alone developed during the flooding did not lead to the observed change of the heel to starboard. This change is initiated mainly by two effects: First, the Garbage Plant on Deck 0 located on the starboard side is connected with the Incinerators Room on Deck C by a vertical trunk. As soon as the water level reaches Deck 0, the Garbage Plant is flooded through this opening, which further increases the heel to starboard due to the location of the Garbage Plant on this side.
Secondly, the leak of watertight door 24 allows to flood the crew spaces on Deck A on the starboard side. A possible path of the water is sketched in Fig. 9 in a blue color and the WTD 24 marked in red. The flooding becomes unsymmetrical here, because the reefer doors in the Buffet Preparation on the port side prevents further water spreading to this side. Instead, the water floods the crew spaces and further up to the freeboard deck over the staircases located here. This area has also been inspected by the BSU on the sister vessel COSTA PACIFICA [12] .
These two effects together with the large free surfaces are sufficient to explain the transition of the heeling angle to star- Staircase MFZ 1+2 FIGURE 9: Deck A in Compartment 3 [13] board by compensating the heeling moment induced by the rock. It should be stressed that no further external moments like wind or current are required to explain the observed change of the heeling angle to starboard.
Influence of the Watertight Doors
A short summary of the most critical watertight doors activities with regard to the flooding sequence will be given in the following. Only the watertight doors located in the flooded parts of the vessel have a reasonable influence here.
The watertight door 6 located on Deck C connects the immediately flooded port Forward Engine Room with the Sewage Room. The opening of this door for only 25 seconds allows water also to enter the Sewage Room. This leads to a quite large additional heeling moment of approximately 750 tm, which first delays the change of the heel to starboard. However, the stability of the vessel is decreased by the additional free surface, which leads to the very sudden change of the heel angle to starboard observed at around 21:03 UTC, when the crew spaces on Deck A are flooded.
Another watertight door in the flooded zone, which was activated is No. 9. This one connects the Electric Motors Room and the Refrigeration Compressors Room. Both of these rooms are immediately flooded through the leak caused by the rock. The additional connection between both established by the opening of WTD 9 merely effects the flooding process. It only bypasses the water progression without having much further influence.
Every watertight compartment requires a separate escape trunk. However, in the case of this accident one situation regarding the watertight door 10 is of special interest. Directly next to the door such an Emergency Escape Exit is located (see Fig. 10 ). This exit might have been immediately blocked after the incident by the very sudden water ingress and the corresponding water column which prevented the opening of the door to this exit. Instead of taking the escape exit, anyone trying to escape from here might have tried to find another way out through the watertight door 10 allowing more water to spread in the aft part of the vessel. In consequence the opening of this door for around 45 seconds lead to a further increase of the aft trim and sinkage and to a further reduction of the stability of the vessel.
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FIGURE 10: Watertight doors on Deck C, aft [13] As already mentioned, the leakage and opening of the watertight door 24 lead to a further unsymmetrical flooding to starboard. In addition, this small additional water ingress plays a vital role for the overall flooding sequence. An additional scenario, with the only difference of no leakage of WTD 24, shows that the heel angle would not have changed to starboard. Instead, the whole flooding sequence takes now about one hour longer and the direction of the final capsize changes to port. This shows how large the impact of a small detail on the overall flooding sequence can be.
Furthermore, if all watertight doors would have been closed and no leakage would have occurred, the time until capsize is further delayed and computed to be around twice as long as for the most likely scenario. Again, further details on these hypothetical scenarios can be found in [1] .
SINKING AT SEA
One of the most interesting hypothetical scenarios investigated is assuming that the COSTA CONCORDIA did not made its way back to the shore but drifted further away from it. It should be stressed that only the wind caused the vessel to ground at the rocks in front of the shore of Giglio Island.
The development of the floating position for this scenario is compared with the most likely one in Fig. 11 . It shows that without the second grounding only about 15-20 minutes later, the vessel would capsize very suddenly in a few minutes. The knuckles which can be observed in the heel angle development are the collapsing of critical large openings on the upper decks 0 to 2. These openings lead to the flooding of likewise large free areas. This is also one possible explanation why many of the victims where found in the aft area of Deck 4. This is the deck with access to the lifeboats and it becomes quickly submerged by the collapsing of the openings and the water traps everyone below this area.
This hypothetical scenario would most probably have lead to many more victims and it was actually pure luck that the current weather condition pushed the vessel back to the shore.
CONCLUSION
The results of the performed numerical flooding simulations match well with the observed behavior of the COSTA CONCOR-DIA during this severe accident. This demonstrates the utility of the method for the investigation of such accidents. It has been shown that the change of the heel angle from initially port side to starboard can reasonably be explained by the complex spreading of the flood water through the inner subdivision.
Even though the damage occurred to the COSTA CONCOR-DIA was much larger compared to the maximum "allowable" damage according to the applicable damage rules, the vessel still survived for a relatively long time. This survival time could even be extended if all watertight doors were actually closed and do not leak in such critical situations. The opening of the doors could be avoided if the overall subdivision layout of such vessels would be designed in such a way that the number of watertight doors are in principle reduced. Another critical aspect are vertical escape trunks, which in addition should not be blocked in the case of entering water.
It is also very interesting to observe how much impact even small changes can have on the overall flooding process, if one looks on the impact of the leakage of the watertight door 24. Furthermore, also any unsymmetrical layout of the compartments below and above the freeboard deck together with any vertical penetration like the duct between the Incinerators Room on Deck C and the Garbage Plant on Deck 0 play a very important and vital role on the capability to evacuate such large cruise ships in a safe manner. If the decks are not subdivided in a symmetric way, even small deviations from this like the compartment 3 on Deck A can suddenly change the heel angle development especially if the stability has already been reduced due to large free surfaces. In addition, the number of openings in the freeboard deck should be kept to a minimum to reduce possible up-flooding ways of the water. Otherwise larger heeling angles drastically reduce the available time for a save evacuation procedure.
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